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5. Personalized activation policies for the long-term 
unemployed: the role of local governance in the UK 
Vanesa Fuertes 
Ronald McQuaid 
5.1 Introduction: coordinated activation and localism 
Activation policies, as described in Chapter 2, have been at the core of the UK 
welfare state since at least the 1990s. There has been a diminishing emphasis 
on income replacement for working aged benefit recipients and a greater stress 
on labour market participation, alongside increased conditionality and sanctions 
(Oakley 2014). The increase of active labour market policies has been mostly 
characterized by supply-side measures, which have been relatively 
disconnected from demand-side labour market policies that aim to influence the 
number and accessibility of jobs for those unemployed. Another important 
characteristic of the activation trend in the UK has been the widening of the 
target groups of activation, some with complex and multiple health and other 
problems.  
It is widely argued that in order to be effective, activation policy 
implementation requires to be flexible, bottom-up, local and with services 
tailored to the needs and circumstances of each individual (Van Berkel and 
Borghi 2008, McQuaid and Lindsay 2005): what this volume refers to as 
multidimensional, multi-stakeholder, and multilevel coordination (see Chapter 
2). There are, however, many barriers to coordination such as funding 
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regulations, the skills and resources of potential partners, competences 
boundaries, and administrative arrangements. As a result, policy ‘silos’ (i.e. 
agencies operating semi-independently of each other without effective co-
ordination) and a fragmentation of service delivery and accessibility have been 
characteristic of many activation policies. It has been argued that the 
proliferation of service providers from the public, private and third sectors, in 
part as a result of the marketization of public services, has increased such 
fragmentation but also collaboration efforts between providers (Stewart 2005).  
The introduction of a marketized activation scheme in the UK has taken 
place alongside wider changes to public sector governance, which is 
increasingly (although not solely) dominated by New Public Management (NPM) 
characteristics, such as managerialism and treating citizens as customers 
(Rhodes 1997). While it has been stated that activation requires new forms of 
governance to transform the paradigm of the welfare state from a sector-based 
to a multi-sector joined-up, seamless service delivery (Karjalainen 2010, Saikku 
and Karjalainen 2012), New Public Management has been accused of further 
exacerbating fragmentation in public service delivery. Therefore present 
governance models could in fact work against the coordination needs of 
activation policy. While UK Government labour market policy at the start of the 
2010s continued on a path of activation and market-based governance inherited 
from previous administrations, the Work Programme of 2011 included new 
opportunities for coordination, and these are a focus of this chapter.  
Our question is: can the governance of activation policy, including recent 
policy and governance changes, achieve a high level of service coordination in 
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the UK? In order to answer this question, both the national and the 
regional/local levels of policy making and implementation have to be analysed; 
as although national governance frameworks undoubtedly frame and shape 
local policies and practices, the local level has been recognized as being able to 
influence the implementation of policy and the delivery of services in its own 
right (Kazepov 2010, Künzel 2012, Finn 2000). The ability of local actors to 
shape local implementation and service delivery can result from a number of 
factors, such as the discretion afforded to the local level, the role of past 
experiences and traditions (Künzel 2012, McQuaid 2010, Finn 2000, Fuertes 
and McQuaid 2013b), and the influence of local street-level bureaucrats 
exercising (low) levels of political power (Lipsky 1980). 
In this chapter we analyse the roles of governance structures and local 
actors in achieving coordination between stakeholders, administrative levels 
and services from different policy fields in the context of activation policies. This 
is what has been termed multi-stakeholder, multilevel and multidimensional 
coordination in Chapter 2. Specifically, we consider the UK’s main activation 
policy for the long-term unemployed since 2011, the Work Programme, and its 
wider policy context. Our attention focuses on the effects of current governance 
structures on inter-organizational coordination at the service delivery level 
because, as Van Berkel et al. (2012) argue, governance reforms affect social 
policy practices. We ask: does the governance of activation policies affect the 
achievement of coordination, the practices of organizations and individuals, and 
the services that are actually offered at the local level? 
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The chapter compares Cardiff, Edinburgh and Newcastle, three urban 
areas reflecting different levels of economic prosperity and different national 
contexts across the UK. The following section sets out the broad context of the 
national governance of activation policy. Section 5.3 describes the methods 
used in the analysis. Section 5.4 focuses on local policy coordination efforts 
across service areas, administrative levels and organizational actors, while 
section 5.5 considers the practices of street-level bureaucrats as the final actors 
in the service delivery chain. The chapter ends with some conclusions. 
5.2 National activation policy and governance in the UK 
In the UK long-term unemployment has increased during the economic crisis 
from 24% in 2007 to 36% in 2013. The increase in long-term unemployment 
particularly affected individuals aged 50 and over and to a slightly lesser extent 
those in the 18 to 24 age group, although total unemployment especially 
affected the latter group (Figure 5.1).  
<Please insert Figure 5.1 – UK unemployment rates (left graph) and long-term 
unemployment* rates (right graph)> 
The number of people receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) is 1.13 million 
(this can be a contribution-based benefit for six months or an indefinite income-
based benefit), and 1.99 million are in receipt of Employment and Support 
Allowance (a benefit for those with limited capability for work because of their 
sickness or disability) (November 2013)1. This section describes the national 
context for activation policies, focusing on the administrative responsibilities for 
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activation, the approach to and governance of activation, and finally the 
changes introduced with the Work Programme. 
Active labour market reforms and administrative responsibilities 
Employment policy is the responsibility of the UK government. The devolved 
administrations in the UK (the Scottish government, the Welsh assembly, and 
the Northern Ireland Executive) have responsibilities for a number of policy 
areas that touch upon employment issues, including skills and education, which 
are conferred and legally defined by the ‘reserved power’ in Scotland and by 
legislative competences in Wales. Devolved administrations are financed mainly 
by the UK Government through a block grant. Currently they can raise limited 
self-financed expenditure through limited borrowing and non-domestic rates and 
in Scotland through council taxes and (unused) powers to raise small amounts 
of income tax. Devolved funds can be invested in employability services for 
unemployed people. For example, in each of the three cities studied, the 
devolved administrations and local governments are offering employment 
services either by public provision or contracting-out, for instance through 
grants, negotiation or (in many cases) competitive tender to the public, private 
and third sector. In Edinburgh and Cardiff, Scottish and Welsh devolved 
employability programmes are in place respectively. 
Usually individuals who are unemployed or economically inactive are 
entitled to income transfers (i.e. benefits). Those who receive income-based 
rather than contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance are required to 
participate in activation measures. Those who receive contribution-based or 
income-based Employment Support Allowance after a Work Capability 
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Assessment have different activation requirements, depending on whether they 
are assigned to the Support Group or the Work Related Activity Group. 
Individuals out of work and responsible for a child under the age of five receive 
Income Support and are not mandated to participate in activation measures; the 
same applies to carers who receive Carers Allowance.  
UK active labour market responsibilities rest with the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP), and are made up of different types of initiatives: for 
the short-term unemployed (those age 25 and over that have been 
unemployment less than 12 months, and those under 25 years-old that have 
been unemployed less than nine months) there are ‘work-first’ services mostly 
focused on job search support; while for the long-term unemployed, 
programmes can include other support such as placements and vocational 
training. Activation services for the short-term unemployed are generally 
provided by Jobcentre Plus (the UK Public Employment Service) and external 
providers contracted by the DWP. Activation services for the long-term 
unemployed tend to be provided by contracted-out providers; since 2011, the 
marketized Work Programme has been the core activation initiative for this 
group and a few other specific claimant groups (see below). UK level provision 
often focuses on welfare-to-work and on achieving outflows from benefits, while 
participation in local and devolved employability initiatives is voluntary and 
tends to focus more on developing skills, raising employability for particular 
groups and tackling barriers to employment.  
The activation trend in the UK has been characterized by a proliferation 
of active labour market measures, the increasing compulsion of participation, 
144 
and the conditionality of receiving income benefits on this participation, 
including the imposition of benefits sanctions (Oakley 2014). The Labour 
administration (1997-2010) arguably favoured labour market deregulation and 
supply-side measures over demand-side state interventions in order to achieve 
economic growth (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2004). These initiatives were often 
targeted at specific groups of benefit claimants such as lone parents or young 
people, for example various New Deals that ended in 2010  (Stafford and 
Kellard 2007). The more generic Flexible New Deal (Vegeris et al. 2010) was 
followed by the introduction of the Work Programme in 2011. Other supply-side 
policies include: ‘making work pay’ measures such as the Working Tax Credit 
(including the Child Tax Credit that partly aims to help with childcare cost) for 
people in lower-paid jobs (a form of ‘negative income tax’); the introduction of 
benefit entitlement limits such as the recent benefit ‘cap’; and changes to 
income benefits such as the Universal Credit, a single benefit that will 
eventually replace a number of current benefits (i.e. income-based Jobseeker's 
Allowance, income-related Employment and Support Allowance, Income 
Support, Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit and Housing Benefit) with the 
stated aim of simplifying out-of-work benefits and making them more work-
friendly. Specific direct demand-side labour market policies, which aim to 
influence the number and accessibility of jobs for those unemployed such as 
salary or tax incentives for employers, have been relatively limited. National 
aggregate demand policies and regional demand-side policies based on 
development agencies do exist, but generally do not directly focus on lower 
level jobs suitable for disadvantaged job seekers. 
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Another important characteristic of the activation trend in the UK has 
been the widening of groups targeted by activation measures. This has been 
achieved by changes to the benefit entitlement rules, initiated since 2008 and 
continued during the 2010-15 Coalition government. These have affected those 
people unemployed with dependent children and receiving Income Support or 
those with health issues and receiving the now extinct Incapacity Benefit (as it 
was transformed into the current Employment and Support Allowance). For the 
former group, entitlement to receive Income Support is determined by the age 
of their youngest child and this age gradually fell from 16 to 5 years old, at 
which time claimants move to Jobseeker’s Allowance, which requires them to 
actively seek and accept employment. For the latter group and any new ill-
health related benefit claimants, a Work Capability Assessment was introduced, 
and everyone claiming Incapacity Benefit was reassessed and either 
transferred to Jobseeker’s Allowance or to Employment and Support Allowance. 
ESA claimants assigned to the Work Related Activity Group are required to take 
part in some activation while those assigned to the Support Group are not 
required to actively seek work, although they are regularly monitored for 
changes in their health status. For those claiming benefits who are capable of 
undertaking some form of work, activation has meant a greater number of 
initiatives and compulsion to find employment through the threat of sanctions 
(Lindsay and Dutton 2012).  
The 2010-15 UK Coalition Government largely continued, and in some 
cases accelerated or expanded, the previous Labour administration’s labour 
market policy approaches. This implied the continuation and expansion of 
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changes to income benefit entitlement rules; a new “three strikes and you’re 
out” sanctions regime with escalating penalties for non-compliance with 
activation measures2; a new income benefit that amalgamates a number of 
other benefits; and the introduction of ‘Get Britain Working’ measures, the 
majority of which are supply-side welfare-to-work measures such as work 
experience, training, and job brokering, with few demand-side interventions 
such as wage subsidies and incentive payments.  
The governance of activation 
With an increase in groups with multiple and complex work barriers participating 
in activation, services need to account for the heterogeneity and individual 
needs of the unemployed (McQuaid and Lindsay 2005, Lindsay and McQuaid 
2008) and of the labour market (Eichhorst et al. 2008). This requires that 
activation policies go beyond the classical job-search focus, and include 
additional social services (delivered by various providers) which in some cases 
are the remit of other policy areas (such as education and skills, mental and 
physical, childcare, drug and alcohol rehabilitation, etc.). Therefore coordination 
between policy dimensions, service providers and in some cases 
administrative/territorial levels (e.g. national and local co-ordination) may be 
needed.  
Local implementation for those not covered by the Work Programme is 
organized by Jobcentre Plus, whose role includes providing benefits, basic job-
matching services for the working-age short-term unemployed, and helping 
employers to fill their vacancies (House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee 2007). Jobcentre Plus employment services and processes are 
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prescribed centrally with very little local discretion on provision and with 
business-type managerial models (Zimmermann and Fuertes 2014). This can 
be seen as an example of ‘procedural’ governance that following Considine and 
Lewis (2003) is characterized by the government designing and implementing 
policies. However, characteristics of Considine and Lewis’s ‘corporate’ form of 
governance can be also discerned in the business-type managerial models for 
providing employment services that have been common in service delivery 
since at least the 1980s, such as performance measurement, benchmarking, 
and auditing (cf. Considine and Lewis 2003, Fuertes et al. 2014). Following 
Ehrler’s (2012) typology, the UK’s activation governance model would be an 
example of ‘procedural’ New Public Management, which is characterized by 
high performance measurement systems, low contract steering and low 
operational discretion on the part of the implementing agencies. 
Services that are not provided directly by Jobcentre Plus, particularly 
services for the long-term unemployed or other specific claimant groups, are 
contracted-out by the Department for Work and Pensions to private or third-
sector organizations mostly through ‘market’ governance (Considine and Lewis 
2003) or ‘centralised’ New Public Management governance (Ehrler 2012). 
Under such governance arrangements, providers’ discretion over service goals 
and processes is overall limited, with competition and performance-based 
payment systems being key features of these contracts. In a few policy 
initiatives, ‘network’ governance (Considine and Lewis 2003) features can be 
seen, where government’s role is that of negotiating and brokering interests 
among actors that come together in collaborative structures and with shared 
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leadership. A case in point is the pilot phase of Pathways to Work, a national 
initiative aimed at supporting those receiving Incapacity Benefit through work-
focused interviews and a condition management programme.  
Market governance characteristics are particularly prominent in the UK 
system, as labour market initiatives, especially for the long-term unemployed, 
are increasingly delivered by external contractors (as illustrated by the Work 
Programme). Marketization has been heralded as the way to achieve efficiency 
and effectiveness despite mixed evidence on those claims (Davies 2010, 
Hudson et al. 2010, National Audit Office 2006, Hasluck and Green 2007). In 
fact, marketization has been accused of creating overcrowded and fragmented 
service delivery. In order to achieve what seems to be expected of 
marketization (i.e. efficiency and responsiveness to citizens’ preferences), 
providers would need to have discretion around the services offered, just as 
service users would need to have a choice over service provision. However, this 
has not been the case in the UK were service users do not have a choice of 
provider and often the discretion of providers is limited (Zimmermann et al. 
2014). Since 2012, the UK model of marketization is underpinned by the 
Framework for the Provision of Employment Related Support Services (DWP nd 
a). The Work Programme is the first contract to be called-off the Framework and 
is characterized by the following governance mechanisms: control of providers 
primarily based on cost, total provider discretion over services, and no client 
choice (Zimmermann et al. 2014). Due to the Work Programme being the main 
activation policy for the long-term unemployed (and some other groups) in the 
UK, and also because the programme represents a relatively new way of co-
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ordinating stakeholders and activities, it is the main example of UK activation 
policy used in this chapter. 
A national activation policy for the long-term unemployed: the Work 
Programme 
The Work Programme was launched in June 2011 and is one of the ‘Get Britain 
Working’ initiatives that replaced a number of previous welfare-to-work 
programmes (in particular, the Flexible New Deal and Pathways to Work). It is 
the UK’s labour market policy for the long-term unemployed, and it is mandatory 
for those classified as long-term unemployed, individuals receiving Employment 
Support Allowance in the Work Related Activity Group (when close to being fit 
for work) and a number of specific disadvantaged groups (e.g. those leaving 
prison or seriously disadvantaged recipients of Jobseekers Allowance). Also 
individuals who have recently received Incapacity Benefit can be required to 
take part in the Work Programme after 3 months. On-going changes to the 
welfare system may change these groups slightly. Other benefit recipients can 
voluntarily be referred to the Work Programme but once on the programme, 
participation becomes obligatory and, similarly to those mandated, failing to 
comply with mandatory activities is likely to result in benefit sanctions. The Work 
Programme is mandatory for up to two years and sanctions are imposed by 
Jobcentre Plus for non-participation (Fuertes and McQuaid 2013c). Referrals of 
clients to prime providers are carried out by Jobcentre Plus on a systematic 
basis, with the same number assigned to each prime provider in a given area. 
However, the prime provider with better results is allocated an increased market 
share of clients over time. 
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The Work Programme follows the marketization trend of previous 
welfare-to-work initiatives. Nevertheless, the process has been novel to some 
extent, due to the requirement for organizations tendering to have no less than 
a £20 million annual turnover. Eighteen companies were contracted by the 
Department for Work and Pensions to deliver the Work Programme in the UK, 
which has been divided into 18 contract areas (with each area having at least 
two companies). These ‘prime provider’ companies (from now on labelled 
‘primes’) hold contracts in one or more contract areas and are in competition 
with one or – in four areas – two other prime providers. Due to this requirement, 
many private, public and especially third sector organizations such as voluntary, 
charitable and not-for profit organizations were unable to compete in the 
tendering process, and it has been argued that this could contribute to a 
concentration of large multi-national organizations in the long-term provision of 
services, creating something close to an oligopoly at the regional level (Fuertes 
et al. 2014).  
Similar to other national initiatives, payment is by results, although the 
criterion to draw full payment includes a sustainability requirement (with 
payments rising the longer a participant remains in employment). There is also 
a clear differentiation in payments according to age, the length of 
unemployment, and the type of benefit a client receives. Thus, prime providers 
will receive a minimum total amount of £3,700 for a young person in 
Jobseeker’s Allowance to a maximum total of £13,700 for those receiving 
Employment and Support Allowance in the Support Group, for example 
(Fuertes and McQuaid 2013c). According to the Department for Work and 
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Pensions, the Work Programme aims “to support people at risk of long term 
unemployment into sustainable employment. Work Programme providers are 
paid primarily for the results they achieve and they will be paid more for 
supporting people who are harder to help” (DWP 2012). However, while 
participants from harder to help groups generate higher payments to the service 
contractor so as to explicitly avoid ‘creaming’ and ’parking’ issues, this appears 
to have been ineffective, as our study and a recent evaluation of the Work 
Programme (Newton et al. 2012) indicate, and as the insignificant movement of 
people with disabilities into employment suggests. 
The Department for Work and Pensions places no procedural 
requirements on primes over service delivery other than a minimum service 
agreement. The approach has been termed ‘black-box’ to denote that service 
providers (contracted by the DWP) are able to design service provision as they 
see fit, which stands in stark contrast to the former Pathways to Work and the 
Flexible New Deal that were characterized by over-specified regulations for 
providers according to the DWP (nd b). Therefore the Work Programme implies 
a step towards increasing discretion in service delivery. In the words of the 
Minister for Welfare Reform, the “black box nature of the Work Programme 
means providers are completely free to design the support they offer in order to 
maximise success” (Freud 2011). It is argued that this flexibility will allow 
provision to account for local factors and individuals’ needs with more 
personalization and tailor-made services. Also the Work Programme tendering 
process aimed at encouraging a supply chain that was dynamic, evolving and 
adaptive to labour market and clients’ needs by requiring that each applicant 
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presented two types of subcontractors (DWP 2011, 2014) – Tier 1 
subcontractors (who generally deliver client support from end-to-end) and/or 
Tier 2 subcontractors (delivering specialist services to clients with complex 
barriers to employment, often as one-off suppliers). As there are few further 
substantial requirements in relation to subcontracting, and also due to the lack 
of up-to-date data in this regard, it is difficult to ascertain the level and nature of 
supply chains. It is also difficult to ascertain if the number and type of sub-
contractors mentioned in the regional-level bidding document matches the 
current local-level supply chain.  
Following Ehrler’s (2012) typology, these new features of the Work 
Programme can be characterized as ‘business’ type New Public Management 
governance that is distinguished by high performance measures, high steering 
by contracts, and high operational level discretion (Fuertes and McQuaid 
2013c). The increased marketization of labour market services in the UK and 
the new governance characteristic described above have important implications 
for the coordination of policies and key stakeholders at the implementation 
level, as our findings demonstrate. 
5.3 Research design 
To find out how the UK’s activation approach and governance model affects the 
provision of services to the long-term unemployed, case studies were 
conducted in three localities across the UK (Yin, 2014). These urban localities 
were chosen due to their different administrative context and economic 
performance. Firstly, Cardiff and Edinburgh are capitals of the devolved 
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administrations of Wales and Scotland. Although both have an additional 
governmental layer compared to the third locality, Newcastle in England, their 
administrative settlements are not identical. The three cities were chosen as 
they covered three of the nations in Great Britain (Scotland, Wales, and 
England), had similar populations, and were representative of different regional 
economic performances (best-, average- and under-performing, respectively). 
Economic performance was measured in terms of three variables (labour force 
participation rate, unemployment rate, and the regional GDP)3 compared to the 
UK average. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in each locality. 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 present our findings from the empirical data collected via 
the interviews as well as a document analysis. 
Section 5.4 focuses on the inter-organizational coordination of local 
activation policies at a meso-level of analysis. The section draws mainly on 
interviews with senior staff in organizations involved in the development and 
implementation of activation policy at the local level. Our selection of 
participants followed a two-fold approach: first, based on the document analysis 
a core set of organizations relevant for policy development and implementation 
were approached; second, relevant local actors were identified through a 
snowballing technique. Care was taken to interview a wide range of actors 
within each case study to ensure that different opinions and experiences would 
be gathered. A total of 66 interviews were conducted (21 in Edinburgh, 20 in 
Cardiff and 25 in Newcastle). All interviews were face-to-face, lasted between 
45 minutes and two hours, were recorded (except four), and were transcribed or 
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partly transcribed. Interviews were analysed using NVivo in Edinburgh and 
thematic matrixes in Cardiff and Newcastle (Braun and Clarke 2006). 
Section 5.5 focuses on how the governance of activation affects the 
individual level and specifically the practices of street-level bureaucrats as the 
last actor in the service delivery chain. The section draws on semi-structured 
interviews in a single (anonymous) organization in one locality in the UK, which 
deliver services mainly to the long-term unemployed as a Work Programme 
provider. The organization studied requested anonymity due to concerns over 
intellectual property and commercial confidentiality. Anonymity has, to some 
extent, reduced the detail and richness of the information presented in this 
chapter. Eight advisors and nine clients were interviewed. All the advisor 
interviews and seven client interviews were pre-arranged by the office manager. 
Interviews were conducted during three days. The interviews focused on the 
interviewees’ recollection of activities and actions in their daily work (i.e. their 
discourse on those activities); on a few occasions, non-participant observation 
took place. 
5.4 Co-ordination of services at the local level 
Long-term unemployed individuals often have complex and multiple needs that 
hinder them from entering the labour market. As a result, activation policies 
targeted at vulnerable groups require greater consideration of various barriers 
to working, and more holistic and coordinated services, if activation is going to 
be effective. This chapter considers the role of governance and local actors in 
achieving coordinated and tailor-made service delivery. Our main focus lies on 
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the Work Programme for the long-term unemployed and some other target 
groups, but also on the wider governance context in which it is embedded. Our 
arguments in this section are based on interviews with administrative actors 
(such as national, regional and local government officials and agencies) and 
public, private or third-sector provider organizations in the various policy areas 
that we outlined as relevant to activation (social assistance, health, childcare, 
education, housing and economic development). In staying within the 
terminology set by Chapter 2, we refer to coordination among multiple policy 
areas as ‘multidimensional’ coordination; coordination among public, private 
and/or third-sector actors as ‘multi-stakeholder’ coordination; and coordination 
among different governance levels as ‘multilevel’ coordination. Our hypothesis 
is that local coordination will be constrained by the national governance of 
activation in the UK; however, we also expect that local authorities and 
agencies will use the available discretion to either foster or hinder coordination 
depending on their political interests and strategy.  
Multilevel coordination: Parallel governance universes 
Due to the centralized labour market policy governance in the UK, coordination 
among various local actors in the activation domain (e.g. Jobcentre Plus, 
external contractors, the local government, agencies) is often low, although it 
occurs around specific initiatives. A major issue identified by participants is the 
limited discretion and influence that officials, including local officials of UK 
bodies, have over the level and use of resources.  
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You can get partners sitting in a room talking to each other about what they would like to 
do, when the reality is that they have got no resources to do anything, because the power 
lies elsewhere. (Managing Director of a private sector organization) 
In the three cities, local strategies developed by local authorities to tackle 
unemployment differ but the participants stressed that local strategies are 
considerably constrained by national UK policy and funding, even where local 
actors are specifically tasked with developing their own approaches.  
Also with regard to service priorities, local-level policies tend to align 
themselves to UK policies through local actors voluntarily adapting their 
strategies, initiatives and target groups to UK policy in order to avoid duplication 
and achieve some complementarity (the latter is also a finding from Lindsay and 
McQuaid 2008). Our participants reported that national and local administrators 
come together in voluntary forums, boards, and similar forms of coordination, 
but rigid central procedures, lacking discretion at the managerial level in UK 
bodies such as Jobcentre Plus and inflexible funding streams of both UK and 
local bodies often stifle effective collaboration.  
Jobcentre Plus as an organization, they have their own drivers, and … Jobcentre Plus 
district managers will sit with us and agree with us one thing and mean it. And sometimes 
that just changes, and they said ‘I am really sorry but we can’t do that anymore’, that is 
part of the difficulties of working, or trying to align national [UK] drivers and local drivers. 
(Director of a local government agency)  
In our interviews, we encountered more mature examples of collaboration and 
co-production, but these were usually restricted to areas where national UK 
policy is not prescriptive (e.g. employer engagement). Two illustrative examples 
include the Job Match Initiative in Cardiff which brings together the UK 
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Jobcentre Plus with the Welsh Education Department and employers to achieve 
a match between the skill needs of employers and the  ‘skills framework’ 
incorporated into the Welsh Baccalaureate; or the Employer Offer in Edinburgh 
which ensures that stakeholders (such as Jobcentre Plus, the Capital City 
Partnership and the City of Edinburgh Council) work together to avoid a 
duplication of specific activation measures (Fuertes and McQuaid 2013a). 
However, the UK government’s recent introduction of the Flexible Support Fund 
for Jobcentre Plus districts could potentially enable more efficient cooperation 
and co-production between Jobcentre Plus and other local agencies.  
Also with regard to employment policies and measures that are 
contracted out, coordination between external contractors or between those 
contractors and local government, agencies and other providers tends to be 
limited. We refer to the Work Programme as a case in point, although it is 
slightly different from other initiatives because although the prime contractors 
are not considered administrative actors, they are neither mere service 
providers. Due to the degree of freedom that prime contractors have in the 
development of policy content, they can be considered an integral part of the 
policy implementation chain. In fact, the institutional flexibility that the primes 
are afforded in designing service delivery would even predestine them to act as 
brokers of coordination between national and local actors, policy areas and 
service providers. According to the Department for Work and Pensions (2012), 
“encourag[ing] Work Programme providers to form partnerships with other 
organisations” had been one of the aims behind the ‘black-box’ governance 
approach. Nevertheless, such coordination does not appear in our case studies. 
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While prime contractors are sometimes present in boards or working groups, 
their role is more one of information sharing rather than facilitating collaboration 
or co-production. Hence, according to our findings, marketization and business-
type New Public Management has not fostered an increased coordination of 
activation services at the local level. However, coordination of national provision 
with local strategies may occur in instances of marketized service provision, 
where such coordination is a required factor in implementation (e.g. see Green 
and Orton 2009). 
In two of the case studies, Cardiff and Edinburgh, there is an additional 
administrative level that has to be taken into consideration, i.e. the Scottish and 
Welsh governments (devolved administrations). Local actors are influenced by 
both the national and the devolved government, the latter also having an impact 
on the relationship between the UK level and local actors. This intermediating 
role of regional governments is one of the reasons for the stark lack of 
coordination between Work Programme providers and local actors. What is 
more, the duality of service provision (centralized and devolved) has the effect 
that Work Programme participants may be unable to access provisions that are 
funded by the devolved and local administrations, for instance in the area of skill 
training. We found this in both of the devolved regions where we conducted 
interviews (with some exceptions in Wales). According to our respondents, the 
reasons for the decision taken by the devolved administrations to create an 
institutional split between Work Programme services and public services at the 
regional/local level are complex, ranging from: administrative pragmatism 
(devolved governments seeking to avoid a double funding of services or 
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subsidizing national policy or subsidizing large private prime contractors); 
different activation and contractualization models (with implications for 
instruments, the pace of interventions and the use of service providers); and 
different political ideologies and strategies.  
The [UK] government chose to award the contracts for the Work Programme to private 
sector providers and some public bodies don’t feel that they want to provide programmes 
that would help people get jobs and therefore a profit being made by private sector 
providers. (Chief Executive of a third sector organization) 
Multidimensional and multi-stakeholder coordination: some coordination 
between “silos” and providers 
Beside different funding channels and governance modes between the public 
and privatized arms of employment service provision in the UK, an additional 
barrier to service integration at the local level lies in split responsibilities 
between policy areas, as represented by different departments at the local, 
regional and/or national level. These institutional rifts across service areas 
manifest themselves in functional specializations, rigid funding channels, and 
diverse policy objectives in each area. This has given rise to a ‘siloization’ or 
fragmentation of service delivery even within single organizations. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, different ways out of the fragmentation of services can 
be thought of: central coordination, organizational integration, and decentralized 
collaboration. In our local case studies in the UK, however, non-coordinated 
policy fields emerge as the norm (although considerable cooperation does take 
place at the regional level). As in the area of multi-stakeholder coordination, 
there are occasions in which different policy fields come together in the 
framework of locally specific initiatives, such as forums, boards, or working 
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groups. Examples are the ‘Youth Engagement Board’ in Cardiff that brings 
together different council departments and other stakeholders to plan a strategy 
for integrated service delivery; and the ‘cross-partners panel’ of the Economic 
Development Department of the City of Edinburgh Council which also brings 
different departments together. However, in practice, the actualized level of 
coordination depends on the specific board and is generally rather low. Thus, in 
the two examples mentioned above, the stated aim of the department-crossing 
initiatives was to avoid duplication and complement other initiatives rather than 
to collaborate.  
It’s too easy to spend a lot of time at co-ordination meetings that are really not about co-
ordinating, they’re just about sharing, discussing things and sharing views, which is fine 
for a small part of your time but not too much. (Chief Executive of a third sector 
organization) 
There are a few instances of departmental mergers in our case studies, such as 
the City of Edinburgh Council’s decision to merge a number of services and 
departments into the Economic Development Department which was also given 
the lead on employability issues; or initiatives that involve different departments, 
such as ‘Families First’ in Cardiff that involves the departments of Education, 
and Children and Families. However, minor convergence or the alignment of 
policy strategies via forums and working groups seems to be the coordination 
‘norm’ at the local level in the UK. 
We also found that in each city, relations between policy areas (with 
competences at the sub-national level) vary. For example, Scottish Community 
Planning Partnerships (in which relevant organizations are required to 
participate by the Scottish Government) bring together public officials from 
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sectors such as health, housing, employability etc. The official goal of 
Community Planning is to improve public services, link up initiatives and 
partnerships in the local authority area, and align national priorities with those at 
regional, local and neighbourhood levels. While according to participants this 
form of formal coordination is far from perfect, it seems to effectively create a 
forum for policy fields to come together and sometimes to co-produce services. 
In Wales and Newcastle, no such community forums exist but organizations 
from different service areas are brought together by different partnerships such 
as the ‘Cardiff Partnership Board’ that includes key public and voluntary 
services, and the ‘Economy, Work, Skills and Learning Partnership’ in 
Newcastle that brings together private, public and third sector stakeholders and 
their respective service offers.  
Our local case studies also show little coordination between local actors 
and the Work Programme providers, beyond limited sub-contracting 
arrangements that usually imply local actors providing services but having no 
influence on the implementation of the Work Programme. This mirror the 
findings of Newton et al. (2012) and the National Audit Office (2014) who 
ascribed the low use of ‘paid-for spot providers’ by the primes either to low 
numbers of participants with specialist needs (which is unlikely in the light of our 
findings) or to providers minimising external costs. Our study also suggests 
relatively little involvement of Work Programme providers in local coordination 
forums, with some exceptions such as Cardiff’s Employer Engagement and the 
regional Work Programme Board in Newcastle (stakeholders nevertheless 
stated that the board is not resourced adequately, has narrow confines and has 
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very little influence on the practicalities of the Work Programme). It was hinted 
by some prime contractors that the financing model of the Work Programme, 
which is based on cost and the predicted level of outcomes and performance 
(Mulheim 2011), restricts the sub-contracting of external provisions. However, 
as will be shown in the next section, lacking external provisions are not 
compensated by in-house services, either. Instead, we found that service 
provision focuses mainly on job-search support with limited specialist support. 
The next section offers more insights on the influence of governance 
arrangements on the capacity of front-line workers in one Work Programme 
office to offer coordinated, integrated services to long-term unemployed clients. 
5.5 Front-line staff and local service delivery  
Lipsky (1980) stressed that policy comes most alive in the interaction between 
front-line workers (or street-level-bureaucrats) and service users. Evans and 
Harris (2004) add that street-level-bureaucrats have various gradations of 
freedom in decision-making that vary on a situation-by-situation basis. Hence, 
when assessing the availability and accessibility of integrated support for 
service users, it is vital to take the work-floor level into account. One 
prerequisite for tailor-made and personalized service support is a broad range 
of service offers that requires coordination either between the responsible 
agency (such as a prime contractor) and external providers, or between 
departments within the organization in question. The remainder of this section 
analyses the availability of integrated services at the front-line of one Work 
Programme contractor office and explores the influence of governance, in this 
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case business-type New Public Management or decentralized market 
governance, on front-line staff practices.  
Constrained discretion, constrained personalization  
The Work Programme has many characteristics of New Public Management 
governance: it is a contracted-out and marketized service, based on payment-
by-results, with clear performance targets and business-like methods of 
operation. As a result of the ‘black-box’ approach, the Work Programme can be 
considered a decentralized type of New Public Management or, as Ehrler 
(2012) calls it, a business-type New Public Management. There are limited 
guidelines from the Department for Work and Pensions on service processes, 
so Work Programme providers are able to independently establish their chosen 
service delivery model. According to the Department for Work and Pensions 
(2011), this flexibility afforded to prime contractors aims at achieving 
personalized services that meet individual and local needs: “The Work 
Programme provides more personalised back to work support for claimants with 
the aim of helping them into sustained work”.  
This is the discourse, but is this the case in practice? In our case study, 
front-line workers (advisors) stressed the autonomy and flexibility they are 
afforded in the organization of their day-to-day work and in the support they give 
to service users (clients). According to advisors, as long as they meet their 
targets and offer directly employment-related support, they have flexibility in the 
pace and content of the services offered.  
We are encouraged to be flexible and to do what is right by them. (…)You know, as long 
as we are doing what we need to do to hit our targets, or we can show that we are doing 
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the right thing for the client, we are pretty much left to do whatever we want, within 
reason. But if I had a client who I thought okay if I spend a day out with them handing out 
CVs they will get the job, my boss would probably say yes that’s okay, you can do that. 
(Work Programme Advisor) 
Interviewees described a typical ‘expected’ working day in which they arrange 
30 minutes meetings with approximately 15 clients, of which 12 or 13 turn up. 
Advisors’ caseloads range from around 80 clients for those dealing with clients 
classified as ‘closer to the labour market’ to around 250 clients for advisors with 
clients that are ‘further away from the labour market’. The latter are generally 
more disadvantaged and have a substantial barrier or a range of barriers to 
work. The targets that advisors have to achieve are around seven or eight job-
outcomes per month and of those around 75-90 per cent sustainability after 13 
and 26 weeks (participants were unable to remember with accuracy their 
sustainability targets). Advisors’ daily work consists mainly of meeting clients. In 
these meetings, they discuss what the client has been doing in terms of job 
search or other activities (normally a number of activities that were agreed in 
the previous meeting), the client’s current personal and household situation 
(more personal questions), and the activities to be undertaken by the next 
meeting. Activities range from job-search to other activities such as attending 
workshops; however, the majority of the activities are job-focused.  
Although advisors feel they are afforded autonomy and flexibility in their 
role, it could be argued that this is counteracted by their heavy caseloads, their 
Key Performance Indicators, and the apparent similarity in the support offered, 
which is primarily focused on limited and intensive job-search and job-brokering 
activities. This in practice limits the discretion of front-line staff to affect the 
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implementation of integrated services (Evans and Harris 2004). Service users 
corroborated this emphasis on a limited set of job-related activities. 
When I first see [my caseworker], she’ll ask how I’m doing, and anything we’ve talked 
about before. (…) Then she’ll immediately tell me about any vacancies that came up, the 
ones on the board. (…) They give me all the information, like how to apply, email, what 
hours, what they need, and then what they think I should do, their sort of view on it. But 
it’s still up to you what you do, it’s just what they think. (Work Programme service user) 
This produces what we term ‘constrained discretion’ or what Toerien et al. 
(2013) termed ‘procedural personalisation’. This concept allows for both the 
limited discretion of service content in practice, and for advisors’ and clients’ 
accounts of personalized interactions that are one-to-one, include discussions 
of personal issues, and afford clients some voice in the pace and (limited) type 
of support.   
Limited coordination of services 
Support given by participant front-line workers to clients consists mostly of job-
focused assistance. It also includes listening, and adapting the job-focused 
assistance to a client’s circumstances that ultimately are barriers to participating 
in the labour market. This is partly necessary in order to achieve sustained job-
outcomes (which are one of the Key Performance Indicators in the programme). 
Arguably, sustainability requires more careful consideration of, and ultimately 
tackling, individual and household barriers to employment. 
In our case study, the pace and content of support varies to some extent 
according to clients’ classifications as either ‘further from’ or ‘closer to’ the 
labour market. There is a typical path of support for each of these two groups; 
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however, it is not linear and clients can access different support at different 
times. The latter group experience more intensive job-focused support, with 
more regular visits with their advisor and more job-activities between meetings. 
The group classified as further away from the labour market is more often 
referred to in-house activities or specialist out-sourced provision depending on 
their needs; and the pace of support and job-focused assistance is less intense.  
Advisors and clients stress that the support offered in-house and 
externally is good. However, in-house support consists mostly of job-focused 
workshops (e.g. interview techniques, using computers, etc.) or deals with very 
specific issues, such as pain or sleep management. In our case study, the 
number of organizations involved as subcontractors is very limited compared to 
the number of local specialist providers. Advisors refer clients to other local 
services that they could access depending on their needs – here, advisors do 
have some discretion in the service they suggest (constrained by their Key 
Performance Indicators, their resources and the local availability of services). 
However, approaching these organizations is entirely the decision of the client, 
and access depends on the availability of services and eligibility of clients. 
Furthermore there is no systematic approach to this type of referrals. 
Participants in our case study recognized that advisors and the 
Programme are unable to deal with the complex needs of most Employment 
Support Allowance clients, whose numbers they report to have increased 
substantially since the start of the Work Programme. Analysing the Department 
for Work and Pensions’ statistics on job outcomes for those in Employment 
Support Allowance (ESA) shows that outcomes for those with disabilities have 
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been lower than expected (see National Audit Office 2014: 30). Therefore it can 
be assumed that the Work Programme is not tackling the barriers to 
employment of those that have multiple and complex problems.  
In a nutshell, according to our front-line case study, the governance 
model of the Work Programme (i.e. decentralized New Public Management) 
means that providers’ limited resources are targeted to those that will provide 
the best and quickest return. Quick and short interventions focus on intensive 
job-search activities, which constitute the majority of support offered by our 
participants as a result of limited resources (staff and support). This may 
disadvantage mostly those clients with complex and multiple needs. Our 
findings seem to challenge the government’s intention to achieve integrated and 
personalized services through the Work Programme. However, it seems to 
correspond with the government’s discursive approach to unemployment, which 
focuses on the behavioural nature of unemployment (e.g. the ‘deserving’ poor, 
including those with clear disabilities, and ‘undeserving’ poor), and corresponds 
to labour market activation measures that are short, intensively focused on job 
search and enforced through sanctions. 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter investigated the influence on national, regional and local 
governance arrangements on the provision of integrated employment and social 
services to the long-term unemployed in the UK. Due to labour market policy 
being a centralized UK government responsibility, we found similar overall 
governance forms in all three local case studies. As discussed above, the 
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delivery organizations of national labour market policy (whether the Public 
Employment Service – Jobcentre Plus – or contracted-out providers such as 
Work Programme providers and their sub-contractors) are independent from 
sub-national government (i.e. devolved administration governments or local 
authorities) in terms of competences, resources and accountability. Hence, 
greater marketization appears to have increased fragmentation among service 
providers. Some service coordination takes place by the Work Programme 
prime contractors contracting-out specialist services; however, many sub-
contractors have found that despite having contracts, they receive far fewer 
client referrals than expected, in which case service coordination is limited in 
practice.  
Local contexts, through local and devolved government discretion and 
employability policies, do play a role in the degree of coordination between 
policy levels, fields and stakeholders, especially when it comes to services 
provided outside of the Work Programme. Variations in local service delivery 
coordination were found to be the result of local government institutional 
creation (e.g. Newcastle Future, Edinburgh’s Capital City Partnership); 
structured forums and working groups; informal relations that bring actors 
together around specific initiatives; and the usage of discretion by local and 
devolved administrations on issues indirectly related to employment policy.  
There seems to be a general lack of coordination between territorial levels, 
which impacts significantly on policy-area and stakeholder coordination. In 
particular, the centralized procedural governance of national labour market 
policy through the Jobcentre Plus appears to be a barrier towards coordination. 
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Although there is often a desire to coordinate, actors are often limited in their 
ability to collaborate effectively due to bureaucratic constraints in terms of 
objectives, regulations and resources, and the reluctance of Jobcentre Plus to 
give up centralized control and allow more local flexibility (although this has the 
advantage that similar services are available consistently across the whole of 
the UK). Local actors are left to develop policies around national UK provision in 
order to avoid duplication or to fill ‘gaps’, or to seek coordination where national 
policy is not prescriptive. However, this fragmentation and disconnection can 
create confusion, duplication, inefficiencies and gaps in provision that often 
become apparent during policy implementation. 
The coordination of policy fields and stakeholders varies between 
localities in terms of intensity and inclusiveness. Market-based governance is 
used by all three local authorities with regards to employability-related services, 
in some cases bringing together actors from different policy fields. However, the 
degree of coordination depends partly on the local strategy. Coordination also 
takes place through projects and funding, but is often limited in time and scope. 
Participants mentioned that coordination could be achieved if actors within and 
across policy fields shared the same final objective (e.g. employment as the 
final aim), but that to attain this would be difficult due to professional boundaries 
(with regards to aims and resources) as well as organizational protectionism. 
Considering the specific national UK policy for the long-term unemployed, 
the Work Programme, we found that the innovative elements of this market-
based initiative have not achieved comprehensive multilevel coordination, 
especially in Edinburgh and Cardiff. In particular, the Work Programme’s 
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funding model has not resulted in multidimensional coordination and has only 
accomplished limited principal-agent (market-based) stakeholder coordination. 
There has also been a deliberate lack of coordination in terms of allowing Work 
Programme clients to use programmes funded by the devolved governments 
due to pragmatism, different approaches to activation, and different political 
ideologies. The lack of coordination means that Work Programme service users 
are sometimes unable to access local employability services. This, together with 
the limited Work Programme provision, affects the support that unemployed 
individuals mandated to the Programme are receiving. 
Although individual street-level advisors enjoy flexibility and autonomy in 
allocating services, their discretion is constrained by practical factors such as 
their caseload, their Key Performance Indicators and the services available in-
house and from external organizations. These factors are part of the 
organizational context which is influenced by the policy and governance 
background. In practice, the smaller the range of available services, the greater 
the standardization of support – irrespective of the formal discretionary space 
front-line workers may have. Standardized support does not allow a 
personalization of provision, which requires the possibility of accessing a wide 
range of services if the front-line worker should decide they are necessary. The 
aim of the policy and operation of the Work Programme, including its financial 
model, are both underpinned by New Public Management and market-based 
governance which, we argue, restricts a coordination of services unless 
established guidelines, a clear strategy, and/or incentives are in place. The 
Work Programme also operates within existing governance barriers to 
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coordination between public stakeholders and administrative levels; this can 
result either in local provision gaps or in a duplication of services situated at 
different administrative levels. 
More research into how national activation policies and associated 
programmes are implemented and co-ordinated at the local level is needed. 
The Work Programme is an interesting case study as, while being only a two-
year programme for many participants, its scale and scope makes it an 
important activation policy in the UK. It is also important because, while it 
follows previous welfare-to-work policy and governance characteristics, it 
introduces novel governance elements that could signal an opportunity to 
achieving coordination, personalization and more holistic services. As McQuaid 
and Fuertes (2014) have suggested, the Work Programme has the potential to 
move from a ‘work-first’ to a more ‘career-first’ system emphasizing long-term, 
sustainable employment with progression in terms of employment conditions, 
training, pay and/or longer term career development. However, opportunities to 
learn from positive and negative practices in such programmes are limited due 
to commercial providers requiring anonymity under intellectual property and 
commercial confidentiality.  
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1  Source: http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/tabtool.html 
2  Non-compliance with rules (such as refusing a reasonable offer of employment or leaving 
a job voluntarily) will bring losses of benefits for 13 weeks, 26 weeks and 3 years for the 
first, second and third failures, respectively. Those sanctioned could apply for special 
“hardship payments” administered by local authorities. Full details of regulation can be 
found in DWP (2012). 
3  The three variables used are: the labour force participation rates (in % of the annual 
average population (from 15 to 64 years, 2008); the total unemployment rate (in % of the 
labour force, 2008); the regional gross domestic product (purchasing power parities per 
inhabitant, 2008). 
